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THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION'S
STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL LIABILITY FOR
NONPROHIBITED ACTS AS IT RELATES TO
DEVELOPING STATES
Daniel Barstow Magraw*
It is now generally accepted that the international community is highly
interdependent-economically, ecologically, politically, even culturally-
and that such interdependence will likely intensify. That close interrela-
tionship, together with increasing industrialization and ever-growing de-
mands on the world's natural resources, 1 has produced a variety of serious
problems involving more than one state. Among these problems are acid
rain and other forms of acid deposition, 2 the international debt crisis,
allocation of accountability in situations such as the Bhopal disaster, 3
depletion of the world's genetic resources, risks associated with genetic
engineering, the use and pollution of international groundwater resources,
and the disposal of nuclear and other toxic wastes, to name but a few. It is
widely acknowledged that resolution of these problems must be interna-
tional in scope. 4
*Associate ProfessorofLaw, University ofColorado. A.B., 1968, Harvard; J.D., 1976, University of
California at Berkeley.
I would like to take this opportunity to say a few words about Ted Stein. An ancient Tamil proverb,
from the Thirukkural, comes to mind: "Rain produces food, and is itself food." Ted was one of those
rare and most valuable of colleagues who not only are prolific in their scholarship but also are unselfish
and effective in stimulating and assisting others to be more productive. Whenever I discussed the law
with Ted, my knowledge or ideas were enriched. We will miss him in ways we will never know.
I wish to thank Steve McCaffrey and Kilaparti Ramakrishna for comments relating to this Article and
Theresa Ketler-Brown, Lisa Smith and Lucky Smith for research assistance.
1. For example, the world's population, currently approximately five billion, is not projected to
stabilize below eleven billion unless new measures are taken to prevent growth. McNamara, Time Bomb
or Myth: The Population Problem, 62 FoREIGN AFF. 1107, 1115 (1984). Moreover, regardless of the
growth rate, the world's people will undoubtedly demand higher living standards. Both effects will
increase the pressures on natural resources.
2. The term "acid deposition" includes all forms of acid precipitation (rain, snow, mist, fog, dew,
and frost) and dry deposition of sulfur and nitrogen compounds (sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, and
sulfate and nitrate particles) that form acids when they contact surface water. Wetstone & Rosencranz,
Transboundary Air Pollution: The Search for an International Response, 8 HARV. ENvTL. L. REv. 89,
89 n.2 (1984).
3. For a general discussion of the Bhopal disaster, see The Bhopal Tragedy: Social and Legal
Issues, 20 TEx. INT'L L.J. 267 (1985).
4. Not all commentators, of course, take the view that international solutions are required. See,
e.g., Smith, The United Nations and the Environment: Sometimes a Great Notion?, 19 TEx. INT'L L.J.
335, 337 (1984) (arguing that the United Nations Environmental Programme "would do well to cease
its work and return to the member states the inherent responsibility for determining on their own
initiative both the nature of environmental issues and the extent to which action will be taken"). The
need for action on the international level should be obvious, however. For example, it is wholly
unrealistic to expect decisionmakers in one state to take account of the international externalities (i.e.,
the costs experienced in other states) of the state's pollution-creating activities in the absence of any
international legal structure providing at least some assurance that other states' decisionmakers will
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The International Law Commission of the United Nations is engaged in
studying a topic that at least some have argued should encompass aspects of
many or all of the issues mentioned above. That topic is titled "Interna-
tional Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising out of Acts Not Pro-
hibited by International Law" (hereinafter "international liability"). Part I
of this Article briefly describes the Commission's current approach to
international liability. Part II examines that approach in detail as it relates to
developing states.
1. OVERVIEW OF THE COMMISSION'S STUDY OF
INTERNATIONAL LIABILITY FOR NONPROHIBITED ACTS
The International Law Commission has actively studied international
liability since 1978. 5 As the first special rapporteur for the study, Robert
Quentin Quentin-Baxter in 1982 submitted to the Commission a schematic
outline to guide the Commission's study, 6 and, two years later, five draft
articles. 7 The draft articles were under consideration at the time of Quentin-
Baxter's death in 1984. The schematic outline, subject to changes proposed
by Quentin-Baxter in 1983,8 received what may be described as tentative
general tacit approval in the Sixth Committee (the law committee) of the
General Assembly.9 The new special rapporteur, Julio Barboza, who was
appointed in 1985, has stated that he will use the schematic outline as the
"most important raw material" in his review of the Commission's study. 10
take into account externalities arising from their own pollution-creating activities. Cf. infra note 93 and
accompanying text. It seems certain, in fact, that global international solutions-in contrast to regional
international solutions-will be required to resolve many current and future international problems,
such as the international debt crisis and acid deposition. Similarly, developing states may require
foreign financial and technical aid to achieve a domestically desired standard of nonpollution, see infra
text accompanying notes 60-63, which would necessarily involve international cooperation.
5. For a detailed discussion of the Commission's study, including its history, see Magraw,
Transboundary Harm: The International Law Commission's Study of "lnternational Liability, " 80 AM.
J. INT'L L. 305 (1986).
6. Schematic Outline, Third Report on International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising
out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/360/Corr. I, at 24-30 (1982)
[hereinafter Schematic Outline].
7. Fifth Report on International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising out of Acts Not
Prohibited by International Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/383Add. 1 (1984) [hereinafter Quentin-Baxter's
Fifth Report].
8. Fourth Report on International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising out of Acts Not
Prohibited byInternational Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/373/Corr. 1, at 48-49 (1983) [hereinafter Quentin-
Baxter's Fourth Report].
9. See, e.g., Preliminary Report on International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising ont
of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/394, at 4 (1985) [hereinafter
Barboza's Preliminary Report].
10. Id. at 6. See also id. at 4.
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The Commission's approach to the issue of international liability, as
reflected in the schematic outline and in the five draft articles, has been
based on the general principle sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, i.e., the
duty to exercise one's rights in ways that do not harm the interests of other
subjects of law. This principle is, in Quentin-Baxter's view, "a necessary
ingredient of any legal system." 1 As a principle of international law, it
imposes a duty on a state to exercise its rights in a manner that does not
unreasonably harm the interests of other states, which, significantly, in-
cludes a state's duty to regulate activities within its own territory. Such a
duty potentially conflicts with another principle of international law: the
sovereign right of a state to be free to engage in activities within its own
territory and with respect to its own nationals. The broad goal that has
resulted from that dichotomy is to allow as much freedom of choice to
states as is compatible with adequately protecting the interests of other
states. 12
That goal has proven difficult to realize. The Commission's approach
thus far13 has been to propose rules that encourage establishing conven-
tional (treaty) regimes to deal with specific transboundary-injury situations
and that assert, in the absence of such a regime, a fourfold duty-referred
to as a "compound 'primary' obligation"--to prevent (or avoid), to inform,
to negotiate, and to repair. 14 That fourfold duty, which is based in large part
on the concepts of good faith, cooperation, and bon voisinage between the
"acting state" (also referred to as the "source state") and the "affected
state" (i.e., the state that is being or may be harmed), 15 is summarized
11. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 35 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 10) at 1, U.N. Doc. A/35/N (1980), reprinted in [1980] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N (Pt. 2) 1, 159,
U.N. Doc. AICN.4ISER.All9801Add. 1 (Part 2) [hereinafter 1980 Commission Report].
12. Schematic Outline, supra note 6, § 5, art. 1.
13. The Commission's approach can always change, of course. New Special Rapporteur Barboza
has indicated that he will entirely review the Commission's study and that "certain basic questions
remain open." Barboza's Preliminary Report, supra note 9, at 6, 8. This indicates that suggestions for
change may be forthcoming shortly. Also, although international liability for nonprohibited acts has
met with increasing approval, substantial disagreement has been evident among members of the
Commission and the Sixth Committee. E.g., Quentin-Baxter's Fourth Report, supra note 8, at 45.
14. Quentin-Baxter's Fourth Report, supra note 8, at 29. The series of duties has also been referred
to as the duty to "prevent [or avoid], minimize and repair." See, e.g., id. at 48. The description in the
text is more informative.
15. The Commission has based its work on the usual examples of state practice, including
conventions such as the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and OtherCelestial Bodies, Jan.
27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S 705; Court decisions such as the Corfu
Channel case, 1949 I.C.J. 4 (U.K. v. Alb.); arbitral decisions such as the Trail Smelter award, 3 R. Int'l
Arb. Awards 1905 (1938 & 1941) (U.S. v. Can.); and United Nations declarations such as the Report of
the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, U.N. Sales No. E.73.II.A. 14,
pt. 1, chap. I at 5-16 (1972) (particularly articles 21, 22, and 23) [hereinafter Stockholm Declaration].
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below.
The first level of duty-which is actually a continuing duty-requires the
source state to take "measures of prevention that as far as possible avoid a
risk of loss or injury" to other states. 16 The second level of duty-which is
also continuing in nature-requires a source state to provide the affected
state with "all relevant and available information" when an activity occur-
ring within the source state's territory or control gives or may give rise to
harm to the affected state (and under certain other circumstances).17 A
partial exception permits withholding information if "necessary" for na-
tional or industrial security. 18 There is a related provision for advisory fact-
finding machinery, the cost of which is to be borne by each state on an
equitable basis. 19 The third level of duty requires, under certain circum-
stances, the source and affected states to "enter into negotiations" at the
request of any concerned state regarding the necessity and form of a
conventional regime to deal with the situation, taking into consideration
numerous "principles," "factors," and "matters" identified in sections 5,
6, and 7, respectively, of the schematic outline. 20 If an agreement is
reached, the source state's obligations with respect to international liability
are satisfied in accordance with the agreement. 2 1
The failure to fulfill the duties to prevent, to inform, or to negotiate is not
wrongful under the rules of the schematic outline and does not give rise to a
right of action under those rules. 22 Nonetheless, the failure to take steps to
prevent, to inform, and to negotiate may work against the source state in
determining the amount of reparations the source state is to make. 23 In
addition, to the extent that the source state has failed to provide informa-
tion, the affected state is to be given "liberal recourse" to inferences of fact
and circumstantial evidence to establish whether the activity has given or
may give rise to harm; such "liberal recourse" appears to be a step towards
a res ipsa loquitur approach. 24
The fourth, and final, level of duty requires, if no conventional regime
has been agreed upon and if a loss or injury occurs, the states to negotiate in
good faith to determine the "rights and obligations" of the states in respect
16. Schematic Outline, supra note 6, § 5, art. 2.
17. Id. § 2, arts. 1-2.
18. Id. § 2, art. 3.
19. Id. § 2, art. 7.
20. Id. § 3, arts. 1(c), 2. See id. §§ 5-7.
21. Id. § 3, art. 3.
22. Quentin-Baxter's Fourth Report, supra note 8, at 53; Third Report on International Liability
for Injurious Consequences Arising out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law, U.N. Doc.
A/CN./4/360/Corr. 1, at 16 (1982) [hereinafter Quentin-Baxter's Third Report].
23. Schematic Outline, supra note 6, § 7, art. 1.4: see id. § 3, art. 3 ("remedial measures"):
Quentin-Baxter's Third Report, supra note 22, at 15-16.
24. Schematic Outline, supra note 6, § 5, art. 4.
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of the loss or injury.25 Reparations shall be made unless "it is established"
that making reparations for that type of harm is not in accordance with the
"shared expectations" of the states involved. 26 Reparations are to be
determined according to a balance-of-interests test, taking into considera-
tion: the shared expectations of the states; the "principles," "factors," and
"matters" enumerated in the schematic outline; and the states' actions with
respect to the duties to prevent, to inform, and to negotiate. 27 The duty to
make reparations thus is not equivalent to a rule of strict liability, but it
approaches, and may be identical to, strict liability if the harm is unpredic-
table or if the harm is predictable and the source state completely ignores
the first three duties.
The ultimate failure to make the required reparations in the event of harm
engages the international responsibility of the source state for wrong-
fulness, i.e., only at this stage would a violation of the schematic outline's
rules result in an act prohibited by international law (the failure to make
reparations). 28
The scope of international liability-i.e., under what circumstances
does the fourfold duty apply-has been the source of considerable conten-
tion; and, although it appears that agreement has been reached on some
aspects of this issue, Special Rapporteur Barboza was probably correct in
referring to scope as an "open" question. 29 One aspect that remains largely
unanswered is what constitutes transboundary harm. This aspect is of
particular importance because international liability potentially extends to
the large universe of lawful activities and because so many such activities
have effects of some kind in other states. 30 A second aspect concerns the
degree to which states are to be accountable for the activities of private
persons. Thus far, it seems that states are to be accountable for virtually all
private activities within their territory or control. This accountability is
25. Id. § 4, art. 1.
26. Id. § 4, art. 2.
27. Quentin-Baxter's Third Report, supra note 22, at 16.
28. Id. Quentin-Baxter states:
The distinctive feature of the present topic is that no deviation from the rules it prescribes will
engage the responsibility of the State for wrongfulness, except ultimate failure, in case of loss or
injury, to make the reparation that may then be required. In a sense, therefore, the whole of this
topic, up to that final breakdown which at length engages the responsibility of the State for
wrongfulness, deals with a conciliation procedure, conducted by the parties themselves or by any
person or institution to whom they agree to turn for help.
Id.
Obligations or rights arising from sources other than the rules in the schematic outline are not
affected by those rules. E.g., Schematic Outline, supra note 6, at § 8. The rules provided in the
schematic outline thus are not a substitute for specific conventional or customary international law rules
that engage the responsibility of the state.
29. Barboza's Preliminary Report, supra note 9, at 8.
30. For a more complete discussion of this issue, see Magraw, supra note 5, at 322-23.
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based on the state's duty to regulate private activities and possibly on its
ability to require private actors to obtain insurance or financial security.31 A
third crucial aspect concerns what type of activities are to be covered
(assuming there is transboundary harm and that the actor is one for whose
activities the state is accountable).
Based on the Commission's and Sixth Committee's responses to his
Third and Fourth Reports, Quentin-Baxter concluded that he had been
given the sense of those bodies to limit international liability to physical
activities giving rise to physical transboundary harm. Quentin-Baxter's
draft article 1-which Barboza stated "so far appears to have attracted a
certain consensus"-embodies that limit:32 international liability covers
"activities and situations which are within the territory or control of a
State, and which do or may give rise to a physical consequence affecting
the use or enjoyment of areas within the territory or control of any other
State." 33 The important element of "physical consequence" requires that
the activity or situation in question must have a physical effect, the activity
or situation must have a physical quality, and the effect must flow from that
quality via a "physical linkage." 34 The physical-linkage criterion appar-
ently requires that the transboundary effect occur via natural physical
media, such as atmosphere, water, or earth, rather than via economic,
political, international-trade, or cultural media. 35
In summary, although basic questions remain unanswered, and although
its scope is subject (at least as currently envisaged) to significant limita-
tions, international liability for nonprohibited acts potentially encompasses
a wide variety of activities and may affect states' behavior or result in
liability in a myriad of contexts.
31. See, e.g., Survey of State Practice Relevant to International Liability for Injurious Con-
sequences Arising out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/15. at 211
(1984) (prepared by U.N. Secretariat). There may be two minor limits on state liability for private
activities. See Magraw, supra note 5, at 323.
32. Barboza's Preliminary Report, supra note 9, at 7-8. See Quentin-Baxter's Fourth Report,
supra note 8, at 9, 48. The limit described in the text is somewhat broader than that initially proposed by
Quentin-Baxter (use or management of the physical environment) and is much less broad than that
advocated by some Commission and Sixth Committee members (economic, regulatory, and monetary
policies and activities, generally). See Magraw, supra note 5, at 323-24.
33. Quentin-Baxter's Fifth Report, supra note 7, at 1. See Schematic Outline, supra note 6, § 1, art.
I; Quentin-Baxters Third Report, supra note 6, at 48; Draft article 2 of Quentin-Baxter's Fifth report
contains a definition of the important concept of "territory or control," but defines only a portion of the
periphery of that concept. Quentin-Baxter's Fifth Report, supra note 7, at 1.
34. Quentin-Baxter's Fifth Report, supra note 7, at 12.
35. Id. at 12-14.
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II. SPECIAL CONSIDERATION FOR DEVELOPING STATES
At various times during their discussions of international liability, mem-
bers of the Commission and the Sixth Committee have expressed the
opinion that special account should be taken of the problems confronting
developing states.36 A notable and recent example is Special Rapporteur
Barboza's statement in his Preliminary Report that he "will give careful
attention to the concern repeatedly expressed in those bodies about the
interests of developing countries. ",37 With rare exceptions, those comments
have not suggested the specific form such consideration should take. 38
As evidenced below, the expressions of concern about developing states
exemplify a tension within the Commission's and Sixth Committee's
deliberations of international liability. On the one hand is the view that
developing states cannot protect themselves; on the other is the view that a
developing state has a duty to regulate within its territory and that the
liability rules should take into account that duty and the fact that developing
states do regulate in certain areas. That tension has yet to be resolved.
A. The "Grey Triangle"
Before examining the doctrinal and practical bases for providing special
consideration to developing states and the treatment accorded by the
schematic outline to developing states, it is useful to describe an example of
current international behavior that illustrates some of the implications and
complexities of the issues to be discussed. The "Grey Triangle" is a set of
three copper smelters located approximately fifty-five miles apart along the
Mexico-United States border-two in the Mexican state of Sonora and one
in Arizona. Of special concern are the smelter scheduled to begin produc-
tion in early 1986 in Nacozari, Mexico (the "Nacozari Smelter") 39 and the
smelter located immediately adjacent to the border in Douglas, Arizona
36. See, e.g., Summary Records of the 39th Session of the Sixth Committee, U.N. Doc. A/C.61391
SR.46, at 7 (1984) (remarks of representative of the Syrian Arab Republic).
37. Barboza's Preliminary Report, supra note 9, at 8.
38. One specific suggestion that may be viewed as giving special consideration to developing states
is the suggestion that the state of which a multinational corporation is a national should be liable when
dangerous industries are "exported" to developing states and harm results. See, e.g., Quentin-Baxter's
Third Report, supra note 6, at 9-11. Quentin-Baxter disagreed with that suggestion and there was no
apparent consensus in the Commission or the Sixth Committee supporting the suggestion, however, so
it is highly unlikely that the schematic outline effectuates the suggestion. For a discussion of the issue,
see infra text accompanying notes 74 and 99-102.
39. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., LIBRARY CONG., THE NACOZARI, MEXICO, COPPER SMELTER: AIR
POLLUTION IMPACTS ONTHE U.S. SoUTHWEsT 1 (1985) [hereinafter C.R.S. NACOZARI SMELTER REPOirr].
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(the "Douglas Smelter"), which has operated since 1913.40 The term
"Grey Triangle" refers to the smelters' emission into the atmosphere of
massive quantities of sulphur dioxide, which causes transboundary acid
deposition 41 in northwestern Mexico and the western United States.
The Douglas Smelter is allowed-until 1988-to operate without pollu-
tion controls but must comply with the ambient air quality standards of the
Clean Air Act within the United States. 42 Apparently as a result of the
inapplicability of those standards in Mexico and the absence of any equiv-
alent Mexican standards, the Douglas Smelter reportedly releases much of
its pollutants at night when the wind blows toward Mexico.43
The Nacozari Smelter is owned by a Mexican joint venture, which is
owned 44% by the Mexican government and 56% by private interests. 44 At
least some of the private portion is indirectly owned by a United States
corporation. The smelter was financed in part by a loan from the Japanese
Export-Import Bank, a Japanese government institution. 45 In addition, a
Japanese company was hired in 1983 to provide engineering services and to
supervise the construction of the plant, as a replacement for a United States
firm that had initially managed the project. 46 The smelter will emit even
more sulfur dioxide than does the Douglas Smelter-approximately 1260
tons per day47-- a large volume of which is expected to migrate to the
United States. 48 Estimates of the amount of such pollution vary, 49 but it is
clear that the smelter will significantly increase the amount of sulfur
40. A Mexican Smelter Has the Southwest All Fired Up, Bus. WEEK, July 22. 1985. at 70
[hereinafter All Fired Up]. The third smelter, in Cananea, Mexico, operates without pollution controls
and emits approximately 300 tons of sulfur dioxide per day. Plans have been made to triple production,
though the smelter's owners have said they will not do so until pollution controls are installed. "Triangle
of Gray" Looms Over Border, L.A. Times, Aug. 24, 1984, at 24, cols. 4-5 [hereinafter Triangle of
Gray].
41. See supra note 2. For a description of the effects of acid deposition on lakes such as those in the
western United States mountain region, see Schindler, Mills, Malley, Findlay, Shearer, Davies, Turner,
Linsey & Cruikshank, Long-Term Ecosystem Stress: The Effects of Years of Experimental Acidification
on a Small Lake, 228 SCIENCE 1396 (1985) [hereinafter Schindler].
42. Clean Air Act. 42 U.S.C. § 7419 (1982).
43. Triangle of Gray, supra note 40. The smelter emits, on the average, approximately 900 tons of
sulfur dioxide per day, Acid Rain Starting to Affect Environment and Politics in West, N.Y. Times, Mar.
30, 1985, at 6, col. 2, i.e., one-third more than any other United States smelter, Triangle of Gray, supra
note 40. Current law requires that the smelter install pollution controls and reduce emissions by 90% in
1988. Id. The owner, however, asserts that compliance would cost approximately $500,000,000 and has
applied for a waiver. All Fired Up, supra note 40.
44. All Fired Up. supra note 40.
45. C.R.S. NACOZARI SMELTER REPORT, supra note 39, at 7.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 9-10.
48. See id. at 10; All Fired Up, supra note 40.
49. Compare All Fired Up, supra note 40 (western sulfur dioxide pollution outside California will
increase by 25%) with Triangle of Gray, supra note 40 (desert air will be three times as polluted if the
Nacozari Smelter opens and the Cananea Smelter, see supra note 40, triples production).
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dioxide pollution and the amount of acid deposition in the western moun-
tain region of the United States, thereby causing considerable harm to that
region. 50
A 1983 executive agreement between Mexico and the United States (the
"La Paz Agreement") provides a framework for negotiations to establish
air-pollution regulatory standards in the 100 kilometers (approximately
62.5 miles) on either side of the border.51 Negotiations under the La Paz
Agreement resulted in an agreement, dated July 19, 1985, to control
emissions from the smelters, including: (1) the Nacozari Smelter is to
install pollution controls by January 1988; and (2) the Douglas Smelter is to
comply with the Clean Air Act by January 2, 1988.52 It is not clear that the
July 19, 1985, agreement will be effectively implemented, inter alia,
because the agreement appears not to be legally binding,53 because Mex-
ico's environmental law lacks the enforceability of the United States Clean
Air Act,54 and because Mexico, as a developing state, has possibly overrid-
ing priorities for developing the border area.55
B. The Doctrinal and Practical Bases for Providing Special
Consideration to Developing States.
The doctrinal basis56 for providing special consideration to developing
states, and indeed a basis of the schematic outline's balance-of-interests
test more generally, may be found in Principle 23 of the Stockholm
Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environ-
ment:57
50. See Schindler, supra note 41 (documenting harm resulting from acidification of mountain lakes
in Ontario, Canada). Even after the currently required installation of pollution controls at the Douglas
Smelter, the Grey Triangle is expected to account for 80% of the total sulfur dioxide output in the
western United States. C.R.S. NACOZARI SMELTER REPORT, supra note 39, at 12.
51. Agreement Between the United States of America afid the United Mexican States on Coopera-
tion for Protection and Improvement of the Environment in the Border Area, 19 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
Doc. 1137 (Aug. 14, 1983).
52. U.S. and Mexico Plan to Curb Pollution by Copper Smelters, N.Y. Times, July 23, 1985, at
A8, col. 1.
53. Id.
54. C.R.S. NACOZARI SMELTER REPoRT, supra note 39, at 36.
55. Triangle of Gray, supra note 40, at 24, col. 1.
56. See, e.g., Preliminary Report on International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising
out ofActs Not Prohibited by International Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/334/ Add. 1-2 (1980), reprinted in
[1980] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N (Pt. 1) 247, 260, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1980; Report of the
International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 36 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 1, U.N.
Doc. A/36/10 (1981) [hereinafter 1981 Commission Report], reprinted in [1981] 2 Y.B. Ir'L L.
COMM'N (Pt. 2) 1, 152, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1981; Topical Summary of the Discussion Held in
the Sixth Committee of the GeneralAssemblyDuringlts36th Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.339, at47
(1982) [hereinafter 1981 Topical Summary].
57. Stockholm Declaration, supra note 15, at 5.
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Without prejudice to such criteria as may be agreed upon by the international
community, or to standards which will have to be determined nationally, it
will be essential in all cases to consider the systems of values prevailing in
each country, and the extent of the applicability of standards which are valid
for the most advanced countries but which may be inappropriate and of
unwarranted social cost for the developing countries.
It has also been suggested that reducing damages because of the poverty of
the tortfeasor may be a general principle of law, within the meaning of
article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. 58 Such a
general principle would obviously support providing special consideration
to developing states. In addition, and more broadly, special consideration
for developing states is consistent with, and derives support (at least in a
policy sense) from, the movement for the New Economic Order, which has
affected many developments in international law over the past two dec-
ades. 59
On a practical level, Commission or Sixth Committee members raised
the following difficulties that particularly affect developing states: (1) a
developing state may not have sufficient information to predict the potential
for transboundary harm created by activities within its territory of foreign
or foreign-owned entities because the developing state may not receive full
information from these entities; 60 (2) a developing state may not have
sufficient technical expertise to evaluate complex technological proposals
or to monitor ongoing performance, especially where control of the day-to-
day operations is effectively foreign;61 (3) a developing state may lack
regulatory and administrative skills necessary to effectuate pollution-
control laws; 62 (4) a developing state's pollution-control laws may inadver-
tently be inadequate (e.g., because of less expertise);63 and (5) the need to
develop may force, or at a minimum prompt, a developing state to accept
foreign (or domestic) investment that carries with it a high risk of trans-
boundary harm. 64 Each of those five possibilities, for example, might
58. Brownlie, A Survev of Customary Rules of Environmental Protection, 13 NAT. RES. J. 179, 188
(1973).
59. See, e.g.. Quentin-Baxter's Fourth Report, supra note 8, at 20: cf. Charter ofEconomic Rights
andDuties of States, art. 3, Dec. 12, 1974, G.A. Res. 3281 (xxix), 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 50.
U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975), reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 251 (1975).
60. Quentin-Baxter's Third Report, supra note 6, at 13.
61. Report of the International Law Commission to the GeneralAssembly 37 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 10) at 1, U.N. Doc. A/37/10 (1982), reprinted in[ 1982] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N (Pt. 2) 1, 36 U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1982/Add.1 [hereinafter 1982 Commission Report]; Quentin-Baxter's Fourth
Report, supra note 8, at 13.
62. 1981 Topical Summary, supra note 56, at 47.
63. Quentin-Baxter's Third Report, supra note 22, at 20.
64. See generally, Second Report on International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising
out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law, U.N. Doc. AICN.4/346/ Add. 1-2 (1981). In recent
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influence industrial-siting decisions of heavily polluting industries (such as
chemicals or paper) toward locating in a particular state.
On one level, the problems identified in the immediately preceding
paragraph can be viewed as relating to developing states as potential source
states: those disabilities would make it more likely that activities giving rise
to transboundary harm would occur within the territory or control of a
developing state. Some of those problems might also be viewed as relating
to developing states as affected states if the home state of a foreign investor
is required to share liability or is held solely liable for harm caused to a
developing state by activities of the foreign investor or its subsidiary within
that developing state. 65 That situation might be present in the case of the
Nacozari Smelter: it might be argued that Japan, on account of its govern-
mental loan assistance or the participation of the private Japanese construc-
tion company, and the United States, because of the involvement of a
private United States indirect investor, should share liability with Mexico
for pollution damage in the United States, or should be jointly liable for
pollution damage in Mexico.
A problem that was mentioned as potentially relating to developing
states solely in their capacity as affected states was their unusually high risk
of suffering transboundary harm from ill-planned or hazardous activities of
their neighbors. This risk exists partly because the neighboring states are
typically developing states themselves, 66 and partly because the govern-
ments and people of the affected developing states are not as aware of
potential harm or as able to detect, monitor, or remedy such harm. 67 One
example provided in the Sixth Committee concerned the transnational
years, leaders of developing countries have demonstrated increased awareness of the fact that environ-
mental damage can have significant adverse effects on economic development. Even given that
increased sensitivity to the importance of environmental protection, however, short-term political
considerations might easily predominate over longer-term environmental concerns. It is also possible,
of course, that increased sensitivity to the importance of the environment might lead to refining the
concepts of "development" and "modernization" in ways conducive to protecting the environment. See
Ramakrishna, Interest Articulation by the Developing Countries in the International Environmental
Movement, 1984 REv. CONTEMP. L. 44, 47.
It has also been argued that environmental-protection measures, for example measures designed to
curb pollution created by the use of products in developed states, may disadvantage developing states'
ability to compete internationally because of a lower capacity to meet those standards. See, e.g., id. For
an empirical study of one aspect of those arguments, see C. PEARSON, IMPLICATIONS FOR THETRADE AND
INVESTMENT OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES OF UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROLS, U.N. Doc. TDI
BIC.2/1501Add. I/Rev. I (1976). To the extent those arguments are valid, they provide a practical basis
for increased concerns about developing states.
65. See infra text accompanying notes 69 and 100.
66. Topical Summary of the Discussion Held in the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly
During its 37th Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.352, at 44 (1983).
67. Topical Summary of the Discussion Held in the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly
during its 38th Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.369, at 145 (1984).
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"trade in chemicals, pharmaceuticals and similar products of dangerous
nature, the use of which was banned in the state where they were manufac-
tured"; 68 another example was the "export" of dangerous industries from
developed to developing countries. 69 Neither of those examples would
result in international liability under the schematic outline, because the
requisite "physical linkage" is absent. 70 As is discussed below, 7 1 that result
seems proper. In the context of the Grey Triangle, however, the asserted
disabilities most probably would harm Mexico as an affected state vis-a-vis
the United States. It is at least arguable that Mexico and Mexicans are less
attuned to the dangers of sulfur dioxide pollution in the case of copper
smelters such as the Douglas and Nacozari Smelters than are the United
States and the United States populace, though one suspects that Mexico
was quite aware of the problem. It is much more plausible that Mexico is
less able to monitor and remedy the harm than is the United States.
C. The Schematic Outline's Treatment of Developing States.
The schematic outline does not expressly provide preferential treatment
for developing states, and none of the "principles," "factors," and "mat-
ters" enumerated in the schematic outline apply, by their terms, only to
developing states. Nevertheless, several of those criteria may have the
effect of giving (and may have been intended to give) special consideration
to concerns of developing states.
The factors listed in section 6 of the schematic outline include: the
importance of the activity to the source state; the physical and technical
capacities of the source state, e.g., in relation to its ability to take preven-
tative measures, make reparation, or undertake alternative activities; and
the extent to which assistance is available to the source state from third
states or international organizations. 72 In addition, section 7 provides as a
matter possibly relevant to the question of compensation: "A decision as to
where primary and residual liability should lie, and whether the liability of
some actors should be channeled through others. 73 That matter may have
been intended as a means of allocating liability to a developed state in
which a transnational corporation is incorporated, where a branch or
subsidiary of that corporation is located in a developing state and causes
68. Topical Summary of the Discussion Held in the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly
during its 35th Session, U.N. Doc. AICN.4/L.326, at 99 (1981).
69. See, e.g., Quentin-Baxter's Third Report, supra note 22, at 9-11; see also supra text accom-
panying note 64; infra text accompanying notes 100-01.
70. See supra text accompanying note 35.
71. See infra text accompanying notes 99-102.
72. Schematic Outline, supra note 6, § 6, arts. 6, 9, 16.
73. Id. § 7, art. I.1.
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harm to a third state or to the developing state itself.74 A factor in section 6,
"[t]he extent to which the affected State shares in the benefits of the
activity," may have a similar effect if the parent corporation is located in
the affected'state. 75 The principles in section 5 support the factors and
matter just described. 76 Moreover, section 5 allows "liberal recourse" to
inferences of fact and circumstantial evidence if "an acting State has not
made available to an affected State information that is more accessible to
the acting State," 77 which may have been intended, in part, to deal with the
possibility that developing states may not have access to the information
necessary to plan or regulate adequately.78
D. Analysis of the Schematic Outline with Respect to the Treatment of
Developing States.
The asserted disabilities of developing states (described above79) have
potentially profound implications for the effect of the international-liability
rules to be developed by the Commission. Those implications should be
examined carefully. As a first step, it would be prudent to evaluate em-
pirically certain of the assertions to determine the extent to which they are
accurate.80
Assuming that many or all of the empirical assertions regarding the
developing states' disabilities and other difficulties are accurate, the ques-
tion remains whether the approach adopted in the schematic outline is
desirable. Applying the principles, factors, and matters enumerated in the
schematic outline to the Nacozari Smelter illustrates some of the issues
involved. For example, how should the "importance" of the Nacozari
Smelter to Mexico, a factor from section 6, be measured-should impor-
tance be measured in terms of gross national product (GNP), export
earnings, employment potential, political stability, or some combination of
these and other elements? 8' If the measurement should be in terms of GNP,
would it be reasonable to require less reparation from Mexico for harm to
the United States from the Nacozari Smelter than the United States would
74. See supra note 38; infra text accompanying notes 99-102.
75. Schematic Outline, supra note 6, § 6, art. 12.
76. Id. § 5, arts. 2-3.
77. Id. § 5, art. 4.
78. See supra text accompanying notes 24, 60 and 67.
79. See supra text accompanying notes 60-71.
80. I have not investigated the extent to which relaied empirical studies exist. Some studies have
been conducted that might aid an empirical analysis, however. See, e.g., Leonard, Confronting
Industrial Pollution in Rapidly Industrializing Countries: Myths, Pitfalls, and Opportunities, 12
EcoLo L.Q. 779 (1985); Leonard & Morell, Emergence of Environmental Concern in Developing
Countries: A Political Perspective, 17 STAN. J. INT'L L. 281 (1981); C. PEARSON, supra note 64.
81. See Schematic Outline, supra note 6, § 6, art. 6.
1053
Washington Law Review
be required to make for harm to Mexico from the Douglas Smelter, solely
because the Nacozari Smelter (presumably) represents a greater percentage
of Mexico's GNP than the Douglas Smelter represents of the United States'
GNP? Additionally, if Mexico's lower technical capability to take preven-
tative measures results in less required reparation 8 2 -a result that is sup-
ported by the idea that a state should not be accountable for something it
cannot prevent 83-would not there be an incentive to Mexico to refrain
from improving its technical capabilities? Also, is it possible to formulate
nonarbitrary standards capable of principled application with respect to
differences in technical capabilities? Further, assuming that the term "as-
sistance," in the factor allowing assistance to a source state to be taken into
account, 84 includes monetary assistance, should the loan from Japan to
Mexico to finance the Nacozari Smelter affect reparations determinations,
or will that serve as a disincentive to potential donors generally or to Japan
in this specific instance?
Another question of particular importance is whether the determination
of reparations should be affected by the wealth of the source state. 85 Should
there be a lower standard of reparations for the Nacozari Smelter than for
Canada's Trail Smelter (which was the smelter involved in the case 86 that
most specifically supports international liability87) or for the Douglas
Smelter, simply on the ground of the economic disparities between Mex-
ico, Canada, and the United States? The most recent multilateral conven-
tion relevant to that question is the 1982 Convention on the Law of the
Sea. 88 That convention provides numerous preferences to developing
states, but none of those preferences decreases the standard of care due by a
developing state with respect to the environment. Of particular interest are
articles 202 and 203, dealing with "Protection and Preservation of the
Marine Environment," which provide preferences to developing states
with respect to financial and technical assistance but leave intact such
states' duty to protect and preserve the environment. Such an approach is
82. Id. § 6, art. 9.
83. 1981 Commission Report, supra note 56, at 142, 172.
84. See Schematic Outline, supra note 6, § 6, art. 11.1; supra text accompanying note 72.
85. See Schematic Outline, supra note 6, § 6, art. 9; cf Continental Shelf (Tunisia v. Libya), 1982
I.C.J. 18, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 225 (1982) (holding that national wealth differences should not be
considered in delimiting the continental shelf). Article 9 of section 6 expressly refers to "physical and
technical capabilities" and the "ability to make reparation," but the relationship between those abilities
and wealth is likely to be very close.
86. Trail Smelter Award (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905 (1938 & 1941).
87. See Second Report on International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising out of Acts
Not Prohibited by International Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/346 & Adds. 1-2, at 12-15 (1981) [hereinafter
Quentin-Baxter's Second Report].
88. Law of the Sea Convention (1982), arts. 69(4), 70(4), 148, 202, 203.
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supported by the facts that global pollution has reached serious propor-
tions, that developing states' activities have the potential to worsen signifi-
cantly that condition, and that it would be extremely difficult, if not
impossible, to correlate wealth-levels with standards of care in any nonar-
bitrary manner. The approach adopted by the Law of the Sea Conference
thus embodies the view that the appropriate way to aid developing states is
to help them meet their duties of care rather than to decrease those duties.
Developing states have counterargued in the context of pollution outside
the realm of the Law of the Sea Convention, however, that, regardless of
how serious pollution problems currently are, the developed states created
those problems by their past industrial activity and the developed states
alone thus should bear the financial costs of remedying the situation or of
not worsening it, at least until developing states have had an equal oppor-
tunity to pollute. 89 That logic would lead to the conclusion that developing
countries should be allowed to pollute in order to modernize, at least to the
same extent that the developed states have in the past. Furthermore, it has
been argued that the developed countries are the true source of environ-
mental damage-even that occurring initially in developing countries-
because developed countries consume many more resources on both an
absolute and a per capita basis, or that environmental damage is the fault of
the rich, wherever they are. 90 Finally, it may be argued, a solution of the
type in the Law of the Sea Convention is unrealistic and unworkable
because the amount of aid required by that approach will almost certainly
not be forthcoming.
The last-mentioned argument is supported generally by the inadequacy
of the financial and technical aid that has been available to developing states
over the past four decades. Specific support is provided by the aftermath of
the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment. De-
veloping states reportedly participated in that conference on the under-
standing that their interests would be taken into account, 91 and the Action
Plan for the Human Environment adopted at the conclusion of the con-
ference recommended that additional development assistance be available
to meet the developing states' increased environmental requirements, to
compensate for significant dislocations in developing states' exports, and to
subsidize research in developing states' environmental problems. 92 Never-
89. See, e.g., Note, Economic Implications of Transfrontier Pollution: National Perogative and
Attribution of Responsibility, 11 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 519, 536 (1981).
90. See R. CLARKE & J. PALMER, THE HuMAN ENVIRONMENT: ACTION OR DISASTER 47-51 (R. Lamb
ed. UNEP 1983).
91. Ramakrishna, supra note 63, at 46.
92. Action Plan for the Human Environment, Recommendations 102-09, in Report of the United
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theless, the amount of development assistance in the environmental area
over the past fourteen years has not been sufficient to meet those goals.
Although the arguments of the developing states are not without merit,
the better strategy is to follow a "unified approach" that combines a
uniform standard of care with assistance and a generous transition period to
accomodate the realities facing developing states. This unified approach
would involve: establishing one set of international-liability standards that
would be equally applicable to all states, regardless of their economic
status; establishing contemporaneously a meaningful aid program-in-
cluding the participation of appropriate international aid organizations-to
assist developing states in meeting those standards; and allowing develop-
ing states greater leeway during the short-term to alleviate any hardship that
would be caused if the new standards were to apply without a transition
period. This approach would do much to internalize to states making
decisions regarding internationally harmful activities the externalities
(i.e., the costs or detriments experienced by other states) associated with
those activities. 93 It would also be more politically palatable to the de-
veloped states, and thus more likely to be realized, than would an approach
that allowed unbridled pollution by developing states while at the same
time requiring ever stricter and more expensive controls in developed
states. Furthermore, because transboundary harm such as pollution is
typically accompanied by domestic harm (as even the Douglas Smelter
illustrates), the unbridled-pollution approach, favored by some developing
states, would tend to result in neglect by developing states of their moral
duty to protect their own nationals from harm. This approach would also
more likely lead to barriers to international trade, as states sought to protect
their domestic industries from foreign goods whose cost advantage is based
partly on the lack of pollution-control or other safety costs. 94 Finally, it is
not clear that meaningful standards capable of principled application could
be devised on the basis of wealth differentials.
With the apparent exception of the references to the means at the disposal
of the source state in article 3 of section 5, and to the source state's ability to
Nations Conference on the Environment-Stockholm, 5-16 June 1972, at 25-27, U.N. Doc. A/
Conf.48114/Rev.1 (1973). Recommendation 109 concludes: "It should further be ensured that the
preoccupation of developed countries with their own environmental problems should not affect the flow
of assistance to developing countries, and that this flow should be adequate to meet the additional
environmental requirements of such countries." The United States and several other countries said that
the provision regarding compensating developing states for export declines was unacceptable, un-
workable, or unclear; and the United States and several other countries also expressed reservations
about the above quoted portion of Recommendation 109. See 1972 U.N.Y.B. 322-23.
93. See generally F. KIRGIS JR., PRIOR CONSULTATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1983).
94. Cf H.R. 15-20, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (which would impose on imported copper a tariff equal
to the cost differential required of United States manufacturers by virtue of environmental regulations).
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make reparation in article 9 of section 6, 95 the schematic outline adopts the
first aspect of the unified approach by identifying criteria other than wealth
that are directed at specific concerns and thus allows for distinctions to be
made regarding activities within one state or between different developing
states. The ability to adjust to varying circumstances embodied in the
schematic outline is thus desirable, but two points should be kept in mind.
First, some of the criteria presently enumerated in the schematic outline
may have unfortunate side effects, as is discussed above. 96 Second, the
schematic outline's ability to be sensitive to differing circumstances is
achieved via a balancing test that is at present so amorphous as to be
unpredictable and manipulable by decisionmakers. 97 The criteria to be
applied must become more certain, and they must attract broad interna-
tional support. In the long-term, at least, solutions to problems of interna-
tional liability for nonprohibited acts will require the cooperation and
active participation of all states, developing and developed. The rules
proposed should reflect that reality.98
Quite apart from the standard of care to be applied, is the scope of the
international-liability rules.99 It has been suggested, presumably as a
means of aiding developing states, that the state of which a multinational
corporation is a national should be liable when it "exports" dangerous
industries to developing states and harm results. 100 The schematic outline
does not encompass such activities; Quentin-Baxter argued that states
remain "primarily accountable" for things that happen within their own
territory, that they may choose whether to allow the import of dangerous
industries and that they can condition such import on the "exporting"
state's retaining liability. 101 That position has been countered by arguments
pointing to the developing state's asserted disabilities described above. The
approach in the schematic outline is preferable for several reasons. First,
the state where the activity occurred is in the best geographical position to
regulate that activity. Second, attempts to regulate extraterritorially would
95. Schematic Outline, supra note 6, § 5, art. 3; id. at § 6, art. 9. See supra text accompanying
notes 72 and 84.
96. See supra text accompanying notes 83-85.
97. See Magraw, supra note 5, at 327.
98. See generally Ashford & Ayers, Policy Issues for Consideration in Transferring Technology to
Developing Countries, 12 ECOLOGY L.Q. 871 (1985).
99. See supra text accompanying notes 29-35, 74.
100. See, e.g., Quentin-Baxter's Third Report, supra note 22, at 9-11. The possibility discussed in
the accompanying text would occasionally work to developing states' disadvantage because business
entities based in developing states increasingly are investing in other states.
101. Id.
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tend to be viewed, in the absence of an agreement permitting such regula-
tion, as interfering with the sovereignty of the state in which the activity
occurred. Third, holding the "exporting" state liable might tend to reduce
the "importing" state's vigilance and thus lessen the likelihood that the
latter state will fulfill its moral obligation to protect its own nationals.
Finally, holding the "exporting" state liable might easily have undesirable
effects on the international flow of capital and technology. 102
A final question to be addressed herein concerns the concept of "shared
expectations"--also occasionally referred to as "shared values"' 1 3- -
which is of central importance to whether, and, if so, to what type and
amount of, reparations are due if transboundary harm occurs and no
conventional regime governs.' °4 The schematic outline defines "shared
expectations" as follows:10 5
4. In the two preceding articles, "shared expectations" include shared expec-
tations which:
(a) have been expressed in correspondence or other exchanges between the
States concerned or, in so far as there are no such expressions,
(b) can be implied from common legislative or other standards or patterns of
conduct normally observed by the States concerned, or in any regional or
other grouping to which they both belong, or in the international community.
The concept of "shared expectations" is of interest to the present article
because of the possibility that such expectations may not exist between a
developed state and a developing state in the same sense, or to the same
degree, that such expectations exist between two developed states (or,
possibly, two developing states). For example, at least in Quentin-Baxter's
view, the Trail Smelter arbitration 0 6 was successful in part because of
"shared values" 107 or "shared expectations" '1 8 between Canada and the
United States. It is not at all clear that Mexico and the United States could
rely on the existence of similarly strong shared expectations or values with
respect to the Grey Triangle. 09 Also, it is not obvious that shared expecta-
102. For a more complete discussion of this question, see Magraw, supra note 5, at 325-26.
103. See Quentin-Baxter's Second Report, supra note 87, at 13 (discussing the Trail Smelter
arbitration, supra note 86 and accompanying text).
104 See supra text accompanying notes 26-27.
105. Schematic Outline, supra note 6, § 4, art. 4.
106. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
107. Quentin-Baxter's Second Report, supra note 87, at 13.
108. Id. at 20. See id. at 18 (discussing use of United States Supreme Court jurisprudence).
109. My research did not identify any discussion in Quentin-Baxter's reports of shared expecta-
tions, or a lack thereof, between developed and developing states. There was one instance where a
particular problem possibly confronting developing states was raised immediately before a sentence
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tions would exist between many sets of adjoining developing states, e.g.,
Libya and Egypt, or the states along the west coast of Africa, many of
whom have different colonial parents and thus different inherited legal
traditions.
The schematic outline is not silent with respect to those possibilities,
however. It provides that, in the absence of expressed bilateral shared
expectations, recourse can be had to any shared expectations that can be
implied from "standards or patterns of conduct" of the states concerned, of
any "regional or other grouping" to which they belong, or of the interna-
tional community. 10 If two states do not have shared expectations specific
to their own relationship, therefore, a broader type of shared expectation
nevertheless may be available.
The approach just described raises a set of interesting questions arising
from the fact that that approach appears to parallel, and may interact with,
the system of rules governing general customary international law, regional
custom, the possibility of special customary law among states grouped by
criteria other than geographic proximity, and the persistent objector. "' It is
a nice set of questions-beyond the scope of this article-precisely how
these shared-expectation and customary-law doctrines interrelate, and
whether the shared-expectation approach will lead to contradictions with,
or modifications to, traditional customary-law concepts.
CONCLUSION
There has been significant support in the International Law Commission
and in the Sixth Committee (the law committee) of the General Assembly
for protecting the interests of developing states under the evolving rules
regarding international liability for nonprohibited acts. The issue of inter-
national liability is becoming increasingly important as global interdepen-
dency intensifies and as technological change poses ever greater threats of
transboundary harm. The schematic outline, which is playing a germinal
role in defining international liability, does not provide express benefits for
dealing with shared expectations in a different context:
If a developing State cannot afford not to become the repository of some wealthier country's
"dirty" industries, it may require international effort-perhaps monitored and organized by an
appropriate international organization-to arrive at solutions that do justice to the interests of the
source State and of other affected States.
Quentin-Baxter's Fourth Report, supra note 8, at 32. That language does not shed any light on the
concept of shared expectations, however, and may be irrelevant to it.
110. Schematic Outline, supra note 6, § 4, art. 4 (quoted supra at text accompanying note 105).
111. Ted Stein discussed the persistent objector in his article The Persistent Objector in Interna-
tional Law, 26 HARv. L INT'L L. 457 (1985).
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developing states. It enumerates criteria that may have the effect, however,
of reducing, vis-a-vis developed states, the amounts of reparations required
of developing states in the event activities within the territory or control of
those states cause transboundary harm.
The desirability of including those criteria is not self-evident. They may
be justifiable as a general matter, that is, apart from any special benefits
they confer on developing states. Close analysis, however, is required to
evaluate the potential detrimental effects of those same criteria.
In particular, the criteria should be applied evenly on a case-by-case
basis without any special consideration given to the fact that one or more of
the states involved may be less wealthy than the other state(s) involved.
Additionally, a meaningful aid program should be established, contempo-
raneously with the effectuation of the international liability rules, to
provide technical and financial assistance to developing states in order to
facilitate their meeting the uniform standards of care. Finally, developing
states should be allowed a transition period, during which greater leeway
would be afforded to those states, in order to alleviate hardship that would
otherwise occur due to the imposition of the new standards.
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